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CAESAR WOULD
by Hugh D. Spitzer
ith the recent increase in mandatory arbitration for small
civil disputes and voluntary
arbitration for much larger
cases, it is easy to suppose that dispute
resolution by someone other than a government-appointed judge is a novel,
imaginative creation of the modern legal system.
But for the Romans who lived in Julius
Caesar's time, indeed from several hundred years B.C. to at least 300 A.D.,
most civil matters never went to an official "judge." Instead, almost all such
disputes were resolved by a lay arbitrator under a remarkably flexible and enduring system of civil procedure that
worked as effectively as ours and, perhaps, more so.
By the time Caesar was conquering
Gaul (58 B.C.), the Romans had developed a sophisticated legal system with
both procedure and substantive law to
match the complex "common market"
economy that existed throughout the
Mediterranean they ruled. At the center
of that legal system for noncriminal matters were three key players: the praetor,
an elected magistrate who functioned
like a combination attorney general and
presiding judge; the individual iudex, or
lay arbitrator appointed to a case; and
the iurisconsultus (jurisconsult) the legal scholar to whom a praetor or a iudex
would turn when the legal going got
tough.
The Romans had lawyers, too. Lots of
them. But the creativity and responsiveness of their law came from the interplay between the prateor, the iudex
and the jurisconsult, and the way that
system worked, might give us a few
useful ideas.

The Praetor's
"Pretrial Order"
The urban praetor, elected annually in
Rome by a citizen assembly, was the
most significant legal official when Caesar was alive and for several hundred
years thereafter. A "peregrine praetor"
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managed the Roman legal system outside Italy, although non-Roman citizens
within the Empire were governed by their
own laws. But for those under Roman
law there were no permanent judges on
government salary, no sheriffs or marshals, no clerks and no permanent courtrooms for civil disputes. If "Gains," let
us say, had a contractual dispute with
"Sextus," and Gaius believed the two
were unlikely to resolve it themselves,
Gaius could have a draft "formula"
drawn up, a document something like a
demand for arbitration or a pretrial order. If Gaius knew something about
law, he might draft the formula himself.
Or, he might retain a lawyer or talk with
a jurisconsult before delivering a summons to Sextus and submitting the draft
formula to the praetor.
The praetor or his assistants would
review the proposed formula with the
defendant Sextus, and then would work
with the parties to gain agreement on
the wording of that pretrial order and
the designation of an individual to serve
as iudex, or arbitrator. We can review
each piece of the formula to see how it
worked.
1. The demonstratio, or first paragraph,
said something like: "Whereas Gaius alleges that Sextus owes him 1,000
sesterces (the main Roman currency unit)
under a contract for the sale of a horse
and has neither paid the money nor returned the horse .... "
2. The assignment, or next paragraph,
would read, "Let so-and-so (we'll call
him Quintus) be index."
3. The condemnatio would then outline Quintus' assignment as iudex: "If it
appears to you that Sextus is obligated
to pay 1,000 sesterces to Gaius, then
condemn Sextus to do so." The
condemnatio could have in it a provision called a "taxatio," which was an
upper limit on the plaintiff's recovery.
This was important in matters such as
personal injury, where the sum at issue
was not readily obvious. The condemnation could also have a provision called
a clausa arbitraria, which in essence gave
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a losing defendant the option of paying
money or performing a specific act, e.g.:
"If Sextus does not return the horse,
then condemn Sextus to pay Gaius 1,000
Sesterces." This type of choice made
sense to the Romans because, in their
system, everything was reducible to
money, and there were no equitable remedies.
4. The next section of the formula was
the exceptio, a device developed by successive praetors to provide defenses that
originally had not been available under
Roman statutes. For example, an
exceptio in our case might read, "If you
find, as Sextus alleges, that Gaius had
agreed not to collect within one year of
delivery of the horse, then rule that
Sextus shall not be required to pay until
the agreed-upon time." This was known
as an "exceptio pactum," or defense
based on a prior agreement such as an
agreement not to collect or not to sue.
The praetors even developed exceptios
against exceptios, such as, "If you find
that the parties' pact was unlawful, then
disregard that agreement in reaching
your decision."
5. Finally, there could be a paragraph
called a praescriptio, or restriction on
the scope or timing of the case. For example, this section might delay the
iudex's consideration of a matter until
after the completion of a related criminal proceeding.
The point of detailing the components
of this elaborate pre-trial formula is to
show how it gave the praetor, who was
usually well-trained in law, the ability
to structure his submission to the lay
arbitrator. Many upper-class Romans,
the sort of men (never women) who
served as iudex, had some legal education, but that was not always the case.
The formula also gave the praetor the
ability to shape law by shaping remedies, usually in accordance with an edict
that each new praetor published upon
assuming office. For example, the edict
could declare that the praetor would provide an exceptio, or defense, for fraud,
whenever he felt it was appropriate in a
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contract dispute formula that he issued
to a iudex. The praetors used their annual edicts incrementally to adjust and
add to remedies and civil procedure.
Each praetor' s edict looked pretty much
like his predecessor's, so much alike
that it became known as the "perpetual
edict." But each year, one thing or another was changed, often based on public concerns and election promises, and
this gave Roman law tremendous flexibility and an ability to change without
relying on formally enacted statutes.

The Iudex
and the Jurisconsult
Once the praetor handed a dispute over
to the iudex agreed to by the parties, that
arbitrator was responsible for determining the facts and applying the law, all
within the confines of the formula given
to him. That formula usually contained
sufficient guidance for him to render a
decision, much like good jury instructions that don't leave the factfinders
worrying about what the law is or what
it should be.
But the iudex was more than a juror,
and it was not uncommon for him to
discover something during the trial that
needed further legal analysis. The
praetor was far too busy to have every
iudex run to him with a question about
some fine legal point. Instead, the arbitrator seeking elucidation would often
go to ajurisconsult, a man with the training, experience and time to consider the
problem and render a solution. A
jurisconsult would have been taught the
law at the feet of a master lawyer or
jurisconsult who belonged to one of the
"schools" of legal theory in Rome. These
were not schools in our sense, but rather
separate and occasionally competing traditions of legal analysis handed down
by generations of independent teachers.
Aspiring lawyers would train with these
teachers and work under attorneys within
the same "school," much as nineteenthcentury American barristers learned all
they needed to know from a long clerk-

ship under an older lawyer or judge.
In addition to teaching students,
jurisconsults wrote textbooks and treatises on fields of law, published short
statements of the law for practitioners
and students (akin to "Secured Transactions in a Nutshell"), wrote massive commentaries on existing statutes, praetorian
edicts or opinions, and rendered their
own formal opinions on questions of
law submitted to them by practitioners.
The most-respected jurisconsultants had
more than enough to do and, if they
needed the money, could earn a decent
living on the honoraria they received.
Lawyers and jurisconsults were not
"paid" for their work; since they were
professionals, they performed their tasks
for free, but they fully expected to receive a "voluntary" honorarium for their
trouble. Many advocates and jurisconsults came from wealthy families and
practiced law solely for community service or prestige. Others, like Cicero,
started out with no independent wealth
and relied on their work for a livelihood.
The iudex system of arbitration provided a fairly swift method of getting a
case to trial, requiring very little time
before governmental officials. A few
standing juries were established to fix
damages for certain types of injuries and
penalties for various crimes, but the referral of disputes to lay arbitrators under a pretrial order remained the workhorse of the Roman civil law system
until the late Empire. At the same time,
the use of jurisconsults provided a way
for a body of learned, and often creative, legal thinkers to develop novel
approaches to problems. For example,
at some time in the early development
of Roman law, a father sought a way to
emancipate his son, but found nothing
in the statutes permitting it.
A
jurisconsult had the bright idea of applying an existing law to the effect that
if a father sold his son into indentured
servitude three times, the offspring
would be free of parental power because
three sales were cruel and unusual. Thus
the clever jurisconsult had the father

"sell" his son to a straw man three times
consecutively, achieving the desired
emancipation. This solution caught on,
and over hundreds of years jurisconsults
were responsible for many other useful
developments in Roman law.
During the "principate," the early empire in the 200 years after Caesar's death,
emperors began to designate certain favorite jurisconsults to speak with an imperial stamp of approval. This did not
put the others out of business, but it may
have led to greater consistency. At the
same time, it gradually led to greater
government control over what had been
a remarkably independent legal system.
But the tradition of independence lived
on, and its strength (and the attack on
that strength) is reflected in the fact that
Papinian, one of the most famous
jurisconsults, was killed by the Emperor
Caracalla in 212 A.D., allegedly for refusing to compose a legal justification
for the Emperor's murder of his own
brother.
So it appears that arbitration by people
other than full-time judges is not a new
invention. And the Roman arbitration
system had two features that might merit
modern consideration: first, the use of a
pretrial formula to officially delineate
the scope of the arbitrator's task, and
second, the arbitrator's referral of difficult points of law to an independent and
learned specialist so that the arbitrator
wasn't left guessing, or fabricating, legal theories about legal issues which he
knew little about. There is something
for us to learn in virtually every system
of law that exists today or that existed in
the past, but the Roman system, with a
sophistication and flexibility that helped
sustain the most advanced economy in
the ancient western world, has some particularly useful notions.

Hugh D. Spitzer is a Seattle lawyer
who teaches Roman Law at the University of Washington School of Law.
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